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ABSTRACT: Jurisdiction has a specific meaning in public international law. As an instrument of regulating 
inter-state relationships, the laws of jurisdiction ensure mutual respect of sovereignty by largely limiting 
the lawful reach of states’ power to their own territories – territory being an important concept in notions 
of statehood and sovereignty. Jurisdiction also appears in human rights law. However, it has been given an 
altogether different interpretation by human rights treaty bodies. The European Convention on Human 
Rights obliges states parties to secure and ensure the Convention rights to everyone within their jurisdiction. 
But what does jurisdiction mean in this sense? In its jurisprudence, the European Court of Human Rights 
has adopted a number of different conceptions of jurisdiction, ranging from the position in Banković that 
closely resembled the public international law limitation to territory; to the Al-Skeini judgment that a state’s 
jurisdiction for the purposes of the Convention extends to anyone under the authority and control of its 
agents. In this article, I shall examine the European Court’s jurisprudence, exploring the different 
approaches adopted in a number of key cases. The article also analyses the UK Supreme Court’s approach 
to the meaning of ‘authority and control’ as it relates to British soldiers deployed overseas. Finally, the 
article discusses the implications of the human rights notion of jurisdiction without territory.   
KEYWORDS: European Convention on Human Rights, jurisdiction, authority and control, extraterritorial 
application, overseas soldiers 
 
1. Introduction 
The relationship between jurisdiction, sovereignty and territory is complicated and has been a 
topic of debate for many years. Public international law (‘PIL’) governs the nature and conduct 
and states and their relationships with one another. In this body of law, jurisdiction defines the 
limits of a state’s authority to make and enforce rules of conduct upon individuals.1 States’ 
powers to prescribe and enforce their will is strongly tied to territory, not least because territory 
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is a prerequisite for statehood (and all the powers that confers) in customary international law.2 
Limiting states’ powers to their own territories also respects the sovereign equality of states, 
itself an important principle of PIL,3 by preventing states from exercising their own powers on 
the territories of other states. Though the scope of states’ powers is defined primarily in relation 
to their territories, in certain circumstances states’ rights and duties may extend beyond those 
territories. Numerous international human rights instruments require states parties to guarantee 
the rights detailed therein to all persons within their jurisdiction.4 The meaning of jurisdiction 
in these instruments has been the subject of academic and curial debate.  
This article examines the nature and meaning of jurisdiction in international human 
rights law (‘IHRL’), especially in the context of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(‘the ECHR’) and how it has been interpreted to subject state agents5 to human rights 
obligations anywhere in the world. International human rights tribunals have adopted an 
interpretation of jurisdiction with only a tenuous link to territory. IHRL is found in multilateral 
treaties, which are part of the body of treaties forming one of the main sources of PIL.6 This 
article analyses the implications for PIL of a break in the traditional doctrinal link between 
territory and jurisdiction. The article presents the hypothesis that jurisdiction in IHRL is a very 
different concept to that in PIL, and that this is because the nature of states’ obligations arising 
out of IHRL instruments prevents the link between territory and jurisdiction from being 
replicated in human rights doctrine. Furthermore, this article suggests that there is no need for 
a territorial notion of jurisdiction in IHRL at all. 
Many states deploy their armed forces abroad, on peacekeeping missions or active 
combat operations. There are a number of grounds in PIL that permit states to act outside their 
own borders. The traditional concept of jurisdiction, closely linked as it is to notions of territory 
                                                 
2 Article 1 (b), Convention on Rights and Duties of States adopted by the Seventh International Conference of 
American States, 26 December 1933, in force 26 December 1934, 165 LNTS 3802. 
3 Though the principle of the equality of states can be traced back to the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and even 
further back to the Peace of Augsburg (1555), it was formalised in Article 2 (1), Charter of the United Nations, 26 
June 1945, in force 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. 
4 Article 1, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on 
Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR), 4 November 1950, in force 3 September 1953, 213 UNTS 222; Article 2 
(1), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 16 December 1966, in force 23 March 1976, 
999 UNTS 171; Article 1, American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), 22 November 1969, in force 18 July 
1978, 1144 UNTS 123. 
5 All references to ‘state agents’ in this article should be taken to include those bodies and all other individuals 
authorised to act on a state’s behalf, whose actions would be attributable to the state under the provisions in Articles 
4–5, International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ 
UN General Assembly Resolution (UNGA Res) 56/83 (28 January 2002), UN Doc A/Res/56/83. 
6 Article 38 (1) (d), Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, in force 24 October 1945, USTS 
993. 
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and sovereignty, determines the legality of this deployment and of the soldiers’ actions abroad. 
Do the same principles govern the application of human rights treaties to states’ extraterritorial 
activities? The now-defunct European Commission on Human Rights (‘the Commission’) said 
there is no reason that the acts of a state’s authorities abroad could not entail liability under the 
ECHR.7 Academics have since argued that ‘there is no a priori reason to limit a state’s 
obligation to respect human rights to its national territory’.8 In its decided cases, the European 
Court of Human Rights (‘the European Court’) has considered the extent of states’ 
extraterritorial obligations under the ECHR and has evinced a number of general principles on 
the meaning of jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 of the ECHR. The treaty bodies of the 
American Convention on Human Rights (‘the ACHR’) and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (‘the ICCPR’) have taken their cues from the European Court in 
interpreting the relevant treaty provisions. In their judgments, the tribunals have adopted a 
definition of jurisdiction that has only the most tenuous link to a state’s territory. This article 
analyses the treaty bodies’ approaches to jurisdiction and states’ obligations to uphold 
individuals’ human rights when acting abroad as well as at home. 
The treaty bodies have all examined extraterritorial application of human rights 
obligations through the lens of state agents as the perpetrators of alleged human rights 
violations. But the extraterritorial application of human rights obligations also raises the issue 
of whether those state agents acting abroad are themselves entitled to human rights protection. 
In Smith (No 1)9 and Smith (No 2),10 the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (‘UKSC’) dealt 
with the question of whether British soldiers deployed on combat operations to Iraq are ‘within 
the jurisdiction’ of the United Kingdom for the purposes of the ECHR and therefore whether 
the United Kingdom was bound by its ECHR obligations in respect of those service personnel 
during the course of their deployment. These two cases are the only UKSC cases dealing with 
the issue of extraterritorial application of the ECHR to soldiers. The UKSC’s different approach 
in Smith (No 2) demonstrates some of the conflicting ideas about jurisdiction in IHRL. This 
article considers the approach of the UKSC and the basis for guaranteeing soldiers’ human 
rights when deployed abroad. 
                                                 
7 Hess v United Kingdom, Application no 6231/77, European Commission on Human Rights, Decision (28 May 
1975), 2 Decisions & Reports (1975) 72, 73. 
8 Theodor Meron, ‘The Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties’ (1995) 89 American Journal of International 
Law 78–82, 80. 
9 R (Smith) v Secretary of State for Defence and Another (2010) UKSC 29, (2011) 1 AC 1 (hereafter ‘Smith (No 
1)’). 
10 Smith v Ministry of Defence (2013) UKSC 41, (2014) AC 52 (hereafter ‘Smith (No 2)’). 
 10 
The next section of this article sets out the normative framework of the scope of obligations 
under the relevant international human rights treaties and the treaty bodies’ interpretations of 
the concept of jurisdiction. The UKSC’s application of the European Court’s general principles 
of jurisdiction are the focus of Section 3. Finally, in Section 4, I set out the implications of these 
judgments for the relation between territory and jurisdiction in PIL. The European Court and 
the other treaty bodies that have followed a similar tack, appear to have broken or at least 
substantially weakened the link between jurisdiction and territory. But arguably what those 
tribunals have done is developed a whole new concept of jurisdiction to meet the needs of the 
human rights instruments, rather than adapting the existing doctrine that governs inter-state 
relationships.  
2. Legal Framework 
The ECHR, ICCPR and ACHR all impart an obligation on states to guarantee the rights 
contained therein to individuals within or subject to their jurisdiction, with some important 
variations in wording. The scope of the rights and freedoms in the ECHR and states parties’ 
attendant obligations are expressly limited in Article 1. The European Court has confirmed that 
the ECHR is only binding upon states that consent to be so bound and that contracting states 
are not required to impose ECHR standards on non-contracting states.11 But it does not 
necessarily follow that states’ human rights obligations end at their own borders. Article 1 
provides thus: 
Article 1 – Obligation to respect human rights 
The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.12 
 
In common parlance, the territory within which a state exercises its authority may be referred 
to as a jurisdiction. The use of the ‘within’ preposition in the English-language version of 
Article 1 could suggest, at first glance, that the obligation to respect ECHR rights extends to 
everyone within the state’s territory. But the French-language version of Article 1 (which is of 
equal authoritative value) requires states to secure the Convention rights to everyone ‘relevant 
                                                 
11 Soering v United Kingdom, Application no 14038/88, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment (7 July 1989), 
para 11 
12 Article 1, ECHR (emphasis added). 
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de leur juridiction’.13 In French, ‘juridiction’ does not have the same territorial connotations, 
unless qualified as ‘juridiction territoriale’. ‘Juridiction’ relates to the power or right to 
exercise legal authority, it does not denote the territory to which that power or right is limited. 
‘Relevant’ means under or subject to. One can be under or subject to legal authority, but not to 
territory. As such, the initial interpretation of Article 1 jurisdiction as coterminous with a state’s 
territory is clearly wrong.  
The ACHR similarly limits the scope of states parties’ obligations: 
Article 1 
The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognised 
herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of 
those rights and freedoms … 14 
 
Just as under the ECHR, the scope of rights and freedoms in the ACHR is limited according to 
states parties’ jurisdiction, but there is no explicit mention of territory. An individual cannot be 
subject to a territory, so obviously the application of the ACHR is not limited to states parties’ 
national territories either.  
The ICCPR contains a similar clause, although it does make reference to territory in its 
delimitation of states’ obligations: 
Article 2 
(1) Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the present 
Covenant … 15 
 
The ICCPR explicitly provides that states parties must secure the Covenant rights to everyone 
within their national territories, but it is unclear whether ‘and subject to its jurisdiction’ merely 
describes individuals within a state’s territory or creates a separate category of individuals who 
are outside the state’s territory but who still have enforceable rights against the state under the 
Covenant. The Human Rights Committee confirmed in its General Comment No 31 that Article 
2(1) of the ICCPR binds states to ensure the Covenant rights to those individuals ‘within the 
power or effective control’ of the state’s forces acting outside its territory.16 As such, the IHRL 
instruments limit the scope of the obligations arising under their terms to states’ jurisdiction but 
                                                 
13 Article 1, ECHR (Official French version, emphasis added). 
14 Article 1, ACHR (emphasis added). 
15 Article 2(1), ICCPR (emphasis added). 
16 UNCHR, ‘General Comment No 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to 
the Covenant’ (2004) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.1326, para 10.  
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not to their territories. Therefore, the meaning given to jurisdiction in this context is extremely 
important. 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has decided to adopt the meaning 
of jurisdiction as arrived at by the European treaty bodies.17 The UN Human Rights 
Committee’s General Comments also support the approach taken by the European Court. The 
European Court’s general position has been that the ECHR is usually applicable throughout a 
contracting state’s territory.18 Jurisdiction for the purposes of the ECHR includes a state’s own 
territory. This accords with the PIL sense of states’ right to prescribe and enforce their will over 
their own national territories, but is meant in the sense that states owe an obligation to respect 
the human rights of individuals within that territory. There is a presumption that states are 
responsible for guaranteeing the rights of individuals within their own territories because they 
exercise control over those individuals. This is a rebuttable presumption.19 Where a state has 
lost control of portions of its territory it may be unable to fulfil some20 or indeed all of its ECHR 
obligations in those territories over which control has been lost.21 True enough, that control 
embodies the PIL understanding of jurisdiction, but it is based on more than states’ rights vis-
à-vis other states to control their own internal affairs free of external interference.  
The European Court has judged that 
The exercise of jurisdiction is a necessary condition for a Contracting State to be able to be 
held responsible for acts or omissions imputable to it which give rise to an allegation of the 
infringement of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention.22 
 
Jurisdiction has thus been called a ‘threshold criterion’,23 according to which the state’s liability 
is determined. But the European Court did not say that the necessary condition was exercise of 
PIL jurisdiction over territory. Instead jurisdiction should be viewed as a prima facie link 
between the state and an individual. When the state exercises jurisdiction over an individual it 
                                                 
17 Coard et al v United States, Case No 10.951, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report (29 
September 1999); Alejandre et al v Cuba, Case No 11.589, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report 
(29 September 1999). 
18 Ilașcu and others v Moldova and Russia, Application no 58787/99, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment 
(8 July 2004) para 113. 
19 Assanidzé v Georgia, Application no 71503/01, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment (8 April 2004) 
para 139. 
20 Ilașcu (n 18) para 311. 
21 Cyprus v Turkey (No 2), Application no 8007/77, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment (2 April 1992) 
para 63 
22 Ilașcu (n 18) para 311. 
23 Samantha Besson, ‘The Extraterritoriality of the European Convention on Human Rights: Why Human Rights 
Depend on Jurisdiction and What Jurisdiction Amounts To’ (2012) 25 (4) Leiden Journal of International Law 
857–84, 857. 
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may be held responsible for the acts or omissions of its agents imputable to it which might 
infringe that individual’s ECHR rights. It should be noted that jurisdiction for the purposes of 
Article 1 is not the same as attribution and responsibility.24 Attribution of conduct to a state is 
a different legal question. Whereas attribution determines that the state had control over the 
perpetrators of an alleged human rights violation, jurisdiction is concerned with the state’s 
control over the victims.25 
The European Court has repeatedly ruled that ‘the term “jurisdiction” is not limited to the 
national territory of the High Contracting Parties; their responsibility can be involved because 
of acts of their authorities producing effects outside their own territory’.26 Jurisdiction in IHRL 
is not a set of rules governing when states may lawfully act outside their own territory. Rather 
it denotes the circumstances in which states owe human rights obligations to individuals. Two 
main approaches to jurisdiction are discernible in the European Court’s case law. In the first, 
an individual is within a state’s jurisdiction (and therefore entitled to ECHR rights) when the 
agents of that state exercise power and authority over him. These agents may be soldiers, 
diplomats, police or other individuals acting with state authority. The power exercised may be 
physical or legal. This is called the personal model. In the second approach an individual is 
within the state’s jurisdiction when he is in a territory over which that state has effective control. 
The territory is not necessarily a legal part of the controlling state but is under that state’s control 
as a matter of fact. This is called the spatial model. In both of these approaches jurisdiction 
means the factual relationship between a state and an individual, rather than the legality of a 
state’s actions for the purposes of PIL and inter-state relationships.  
2.1. Personal Model 
2.1.1. Cyprus v Turkey 
Cyprus and Turkey are both states parties to the ECHR. In 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus and 
came to occupy the Northern 40 per cent of the island. The Cypriot Government alleged that 
Turkish troops in Northern Cyprus had committed widespread violations of the ECHR. Before 
examining the merits of the application, the Commission had to determine whether the 
                                                 
24 Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections), Application no 15318/89, European Court of Human Rights, 
Judgment (23 March 1995) para 61 
25 Marko Milanović, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles and Policy (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2011) 51. 
26 Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain, Application no 12747/87, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment 
(26 June 1992) para 91. 
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individuals affected were within Turkey’s jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 of the ECHR 
(and therefore whether Turkey was a capable respondent to the application), despite those 
individuals being within Cyprus’ sovereign territory.27  
The Commission decided: 
It is clear from the language, in particular, of the French text, and the object of this Article, and 
from the purpose of the Convention as a whole, that the High Contracting Parties are bound to 
secure the said rights and freedoms to all persons under their actual authority and 
responsibility, whether that authority is exercised within their own territory or abroad.28 
 
Even though Turkey had not extended civil, criminal or political authority to Northern Cyprus, 
its responsibility for violations of ECHR rights would stem from its actual control over the local 
population. Those individuals under Turkey’s actual control would be within its jurisdiction, 
and Turkey would be obliged to secure their ECHR rights.  
The Commission went on: 
[N]ationals of a State, including registered ships and aircraft, are partly within its jurisdiction 
wherever they may be, and that authorised agents of a State, including diplomatic or consular 
agents and armed forces, not only remain under its jurisdiction when abroad but bring any 
other persons or property ‘within the jurisdiction’ of that State, to the extent that they exercise 
authority over such persons or property. In so far as, by their acts or omissions, they affect 
such persons or property, the responsibility of the State is engaged.29 
 
The Commission makes it clear that individuals are within a state’s jurisdiction for the purposes 
of the ECHR because of the control exercised over them by state agents, even where those 
agents are acting beyond the territory of their own state.  
In the second of the Cyprus cases, the Commission approved of its earlier decision that 
persons and property are within the jurisdiction of a contracting state to the extent that the state 
exercises some control over them.30 By the time that case came before the Commission, Turkey 
had established the ‘Turkish Federated State of Cyprus’ as an independent state in the occupied 
territories. This state was unrecognised by the international community and it was not viewed 
                                                 
27 Cyprus has made a number of applications to the ECHR bodies regarding the actions of Turkish authorities 
during the ongoing occupation of Cyprus: Cyprus v Turkey (No 1), Application no 6780/74, European Commission 
on Human Rights, Decision (26 May 1975), 2 Decisions & Reports (1975) 125; Cyprus v Turkey (No 2) (n 21); 
Cyprus v Turkey (No 3), Application no 25781/94, European Commission on Human Rights, Decision (1 January 
1997); Cyprus v Turkey (No 3), Application no 25781/94, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment (10 May 
2001). For more detailed facts, see Cyprus v Turkey (No 1), 127–129. 
28 Cyprus v Turkey (No 1) (n 27) 136 (emphasis added). 
29 Ibid (emphasis added). 
30 Cyprus v Turkey (No 2) (n 21) para 63. 
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by the Commission as an entity capable of exercising jurisdiction over any part of the island.31 
Turkey’s jurisdiction persisted, and it would be responsible for violations of the Convention 
imputable to it by virtue of the continued direct, physical control exercised by its soldiers in the 
occupied territories. It further implied that Turkish jurisdiction over individuals in the occupied 
Northern territories was exclusive, since Cyprus had ‘been prevented from exercising its 
jurisdiction’ there by virtue of the occupation.32  
The Commission’s decisions in the Cyprus cases clearly support the idea that 
jurisdiction for the purposes of IHRL is a concept quite distinct from that in PIL. But in reading 
their decision it is quite easy to muddle the two concepts. State agents acting abroad are under 
the orders of their state and are subject to their state’s laws and enforcement mechanisms to 
varying degrees. By virtue of the occupation, Cyprus had indeed been prevented from enforcing 
its will over the Northern half of the island for the purposes of the PIL concept of jurisdiction. 
The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus did not possess jurisdiction for the purposes of the PIL 
concept because it was not a state (the capacity to enter into relations with other states being a 
prerequisite of statehood,33 which the Turkish Federated State lacked because it also lacked 
international recognition) and so did not have rights and duties vis-à-vis other states. But the 
Commission’s decision should not be read as referring to the PIL concept of jurisdiction as the 
state’s right to prescribe and enforce its will.  
A more appropriate interpretation of the Commission’s decision is that Cyprus had lost the 
ability to ensure the ECHR rights to the population of the occupied Northern territories because 
it had lost its physical and legal control over that population. State agents are within their own 
state’s jurisdiction because of the control exercised over them. The Turkish Federated State was 
not capable of exercising jurisdiction over the population for the purposes of Article 1 because 
it was not a state party to the ECHR.34 The decisions did not concern the rights and duties of 
Cyprus and Turkey vis-à-vis each other and so the norms governing that relationship are of no 
application. The decisions were about the two states’ obligations to the individuals under their 
control. 
                                                 
31 Cyprus v Turkey (No 2) (n 21) para 63. 
32 Cyprus v Turkey (No 2) (n 21) para 63. 
33 Article 1(d), Montevideo Convention.  
34 It should be noted Turkey argued that the Turkish Federated State exercised jurisdiction over the occupied 
Northern territories to support its own claim that the local population were not subject to its own jurisdiction and 
that Turkey would not therefore be liable for any alleged violations of the ECHR. If the local population were 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Turkish Federated State, which was not a state party to the ECHR, any allegations 
of ECHR violations would go unanswered. 
 16 
2.1.2. Other Cases Employing the Personal Model 
The Court and Commission have confirmed the Cyprus Commission’s view in a number of 
subsequent cases.35 Although the facts of the various cases are conceptually different, the 
ECHR bodies have applied the same general principle to all; that individuals are within a state’s 
jurisdiction by virtue of being under the authority and control of its agents. Individuals arrested 
by state agents abroad are within that state’s jurisdiction from the moment they are taken into 
its agents’ custody.36 The detaining state will be liable for any violations of Convention rights 
occurring during that custody, even though their agents are acting beyond their own territories, 
and even if they occur on the territory of another ECHR state party.  
In the case of Medvedyev, a Cambodia-registered ship was intercepted on the high seas 
by a French naval vessel on suspicion of carrying narcotics. Upon boarding the vessel, French 
forces discovered a large quantity of drugs and confined the crew to quarters, setting a new 
course for France where the crew would be prosecuted. During their detention on the ship, the 
crew were within French jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1, because France ‘exercised 
full and exclusive control over the [ship] and its crew, at least de facto, from the time of its 
interception, in a continuous and uninterrupted manner’.37 The question for the Grand Chamber 
in Medvedyev was not whether the actions of the French forces were lawful for the purposes of 
France’s obligations to Cambodia, but rather whether the Cambodian crew were under the 
actual physical control of the French naval forces. By virtue of that actual physical control, 
French forces were in a position to act in such a way that might constitute a violation of ECHR 
rights. It is this capacity to violate ECHR rights that constitutes jurisdiction for the purposes of 
IHRL.  
In all of these cases, the state has enjoyed some direct physical control over the applicant 
in the form of detention. In the Cyprus cases, the mere presence of Turkish troops as occupying 
forces in the North of the island gave Turkey physical control over the local population. But the 
Court has judged that individuals can be within a state’s jurisdiction even when they are not 
                                                 
35 W v Ireland, Application no 9360/81, European Commission on Human Rights, Decision (28 February 1983), 
32 Decisions & Reports (1983) 211, 215; Vearncombe v Germany and United Kingdom, Application no 12816/87, 
European Commission on Human Rights, Decision (18 January 1989), 59 Decisions & Reports (1989) 186, 194. 
36 Freda v Italy, Application no 8916/80, European Commission on Human Rights, Decision (7 October 1980), 21 
Decisions & Reports (1980) 250, 256; Sánchez Ramirez v France, Application no 28780/95, European 
Commission on Human Rights, Decision (24 June 1996), 86 Decisions & Reports (1996) 155, 162; Öcalan v 
Turkey, Application no 46221/99, European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Judgment (12 May 2005) 
para 91. 
37 Medvedyev v France, Application no 3394/03, European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Judgment 
(29 March 2010) para 67. 
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held in custody. In another case involving the Turkish occupation of Cyprus, a Cypriot protester 
was beaten to death in the neutral UN-controlled buffer zone. Though he was not in their 
custody, he was subject to the Turkish forces’ physical control and thus within Turkish 
jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1.38 Similarly, where Kurdish shepherds were murdered 
in Northern Iraq, the Court judged that the shepherds would have been within Turkish 
jurisdiction had there been any physical evidence linking their deaths to Turkish soldiers.39 
As well as direct physical control, the acts and omissions of diplomats and consular 
officials affecting the rights of individuals will bring those individuals within the relevant 
state’s jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 of the ECHR. The Commission recognised this 
much earlier than the first Cyprus decision,40 in which the Commission merely clarified that the 
rule was still valid. The Commission has reiterated this position in subsequent cases involving 
allegations that British consular officials failed to return a kidnapped child from Jordan,41 and 
when the Danish ambassador to East Germany called the police to remove a group of would-
be migrants from the embassy.42 The migrants were considered to be within Danish jurisdiction 
vis-à-vis the ambassador’s actions, even though he was outside Denmark and the Commission 
did not consider the embassy to be part of Danish territory. 
The Commission’s decision in M v Denmark is interesting, since it concerns individual 
rights that refer explicitly to territory. The applicants claimed that their right to move freely 
through Danish territory had been unlawfully infringed,43 and that they had been expelled from 
Denmark without due process of law.44 The Commission determined that the embassy was not 
part of Danish territory and so the applicants’ rights under Protocols Nos 4 and 7 could not have 
been violated, whilst simultaneously finding that they were in fact within Danish jurisdiction 
for the purposes of their ECHR rights. This shows quite plainly how jurisdiction in IHRL is a 
different concept to that in PIL generally, which states the jurisdiction is primarily territorial. 
For a state to be held liable under the ECHR the relevant consideration in the personal model 
                                                 
38 Isaak v Turkey, Application no 44587/98, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment (24 June 2008). 
39 Issa v Turkey, Application no 31821/96, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment (16 November 2004) para 
79. 
40 X v Germany, Application no 1611/62, European Commission on Human Rights, Decision (25 September 1965), 
8 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights (1965) 158, 168. 
41 X v United Kingdom, Application no 7547/76, European Commission on Human Rights, Decision (15 December 
1977), 12 Decisions & Reports (1977) 73, 74. 
42 M v Denmark, Application no 17392/90, European Commission on Human Rights, Decision (14 October 1992). 
43 Protocol No 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, securing 
certain rights and freedoms other than those already included in the Convention and in the first Protocol thereto, 
as amended by Protocol No 11, 6 September 1963, in force 2 May 1968, ETS 46. 
44 Protocol No 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended 
by Protocol No 11, 22 November 1984, in force 1 November 1988, ETS 117. 
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is simply whether the agents of that state had control or authority over the individual, 
irrespective of where in the world that occurs. 
The Commission and European Court have developed this personal model of 
jurisdiction to prevent an interpretation of Article 1 that would allow a ‘State Party to perpetrate 
violations of the Convention on the territory of another State, which it could not perpetrate on 
its own territory’.45 The Court has quoted this passage verbatim from the views of the United 
Nations Committee on Human Rights.46 In a pair of cases, the Human Rights Committee was 
asked to evaluate whether Uruguay had violated ICCPR provisions by sending security forces 
to arrest and hold suspects in incommunicado detention in Argentina and Brazil, before 
transferring them back to Uruguay for trial. The applicants in those cases were entitled to the 
protections of the ICCPR against Uruguay, due to being under the state agents’ physical control.  
The personal model is highly individualistic, the state’s physical or legal control over 
an individual being the nexus establishing the obligation.47 The essence of the personal model 
is that an individual is within the state’s jurisdiction where the state’s actions affect his ability 
to exercise his ECHR rights.48 Whilst IHRL is found in multilateral treaties that create mutual 
and collective enforcement obligations on states parties, the primary obligation in these treaties 
is not to other states, but to individuals. Where human rights are predicated on the assumption 
that all human beings are equal and that the rights contained in the treaties are inherent to all 
people,49 it would be absurd for a state to have obligations to individuals within its own territory 
but not to those outside its territory but nevertheless subject to its physical control. The personal 
model arguably recognises that states possess enormous coercive power over individuals and 
that power is not necessarily limited to a state’s territory.  
There is a link between the two concepts of jurisdiction in PIL and IHRL. When an 
individual is ‘brought within the jurisdiction’ of a state for the purposes of IHRL by virtue of 
being under state agent authority and control, the actions of the state constitute an exercise of 
jurisdiction in the PIL sense. In Medvedyev, when French naval forces arrested the ship’s crew 
and transported them back to France to stand trial for drugs offences, they were exercising 
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France’s power (normally constrained to its national territory) to impose its law, beyond French 
territory. In Öcalan, the Turkish police officers who arrested Öcalan in Kenya were exercising 
Turkey’s power (normally constrained to its national territory) to arrest those suspected of 
violating national law, outside Turkey. In all the cases in which the personal model has been 
applied, state agents have acted in a way that can be considered an exercise of PIL jurisdiction. 
PIL jurisdiction determines whether that action was lawful considering states’ duties to one 
another and the obligation to uphold the sovereign equality of states. But IHRL jurisdiction 
does not depend upon the exercise of the state’s power being lawful for the purposes of PIL. 
The personal model is only the first of two models of jurisdiction recognised by the European 
Court. The second approach contains a much stronger link to territory. 
2.2. Spatial Model 
2.2.1. Loizidou v Turkey 
In Loizidou, the applicant was denied access to her property in Turkish-controlled Northern 
Cyprus and had been detained by Turkish soldiers and Turkish-Cypriot police in the course of 
a peaceful demonstration.50 She alleged numerous violations of her ECHR rights regarding 
property and detention. The Court repeated the principle that the Convention is not limited to 
the contracting states’ national territories. Individuals in a foreign territory under the state’s 
effective control will also be within its jurisdiction. 
Bearing in mind the object and purpose of the Convention, the responsibility of a Contracting 
Party may also arise when as a consequence of military action – whether lawful or unlawful – 
it exercises control of an area outside its national territory. The obligation to secure, in such 
an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention derives from the fact of such control 
whether it be exercised directly, through its armed forces, or through a subordinate local 
administration.51 
 
Through its military occupation in Northern Cyprus, Turkey had effective control of that 
territory. Effective control is a question of fact that will depend upon all the circumstances. 
There is no specific legal threshold that must be reached in order for a state to have effective 
control over territory. In Loizidou, the sheer number of troops on the ground and the duration 
of the occupation were sufficient to establish Turkey’s effective control, even though it did not 
directly administer the territory as part of Turkey.52 Furthermore, the ‘Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus’, a unilaterally-declared sovereign state in Northern Cyprus, relied upon 
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Turkish military presence for its survival.53 It was thus a subordinate local administration and 
individuals under their nominal authority would be within Turkish jurisdiction. Turkey’s lack 
of detailed control or involvement in the administration’s policy was irrelevant.54 In spite of not 
having control over the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ governmental functions, events 
within Northern Cyprus occurred under Turkish control.  
In PIL, the effective control doctrine is more concerned with attribution of conduct to a state 
for determining that state’s liability for acts violating international law. Under the effective 
control doctrine, an individual’s conduct is attributable to the state if that state had effective 
control of the individual at the material time. The International Court of Justice used the 
effective control test in the Nicaragua case,55 concerning United States’ support of the contras 
rebel group in Nicaragua. The degree of control exercised by the US Government over the 
contras’ activities would determine whether the group’s actions were attributable to the US for 
the purposes of liability for a violation of PIL.56 Although the contras were dependent upon US 
support for their activities,57 the Court was not persuaded by the evidence before it that the US 
exerted sufficient control over the contras to be held liable for their actions.58 Similarly, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) considered Yugoslavia’s 
control over the Bosnian Serb Army for the purposes of determining the state’s responsibility 
for the crimes for which it stood accused during the Bosnian War.59 Whilst distinguishing the 
events of the Bosnian War from those in the Nicaragua case, the ICTY applied a similar test 
and concluded that Yugoslavia exercised sufficient effective control over the Bosnian Serb 
Army for the acts of the latter to be attributed to it.60 The European Court’s approach to effective 
control signals yet another departure from PIL.  
2.2.2. Other Cases Employing the Spatial Model 
The European Court repeated its principles in response to Transdniestrian separatists in 
Moldova. Both Moldova and Russia are states parties to the ECHR. Russian military and 
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political support greatly strengthened the ‘Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria’, which had 
unilaterally declared independence from Moldova.61 Though not dependent upon Russian 
support for its survival, the separatist entity was under Russia’s decisive influence.62 Individuals 
within Transdniestria were within Russian jurisdiction, and Russia was under the obligation to 
secure ECHR rights to those individuals.63 As in all the human rights jurisdiction cases, this 
spatial model of jurisdiction is not concerned with where states are permitted to exercise the 
powers conferred by statehood, but when and where their ECHR obligations are engaged. 
The European Court has not restricted itself to finding jurisdiction when states have 
control over the whole of another state’s territory, or even large swathes of it like in Loizidou 
and Ilașcu. The Court stated that the presence of troops in an area gives the state effective 
control over the area in which they are active, but not the whole territory of the state.64 Aerial 
military action, however, does not establish effective control of a territory without a 
simultaneous ground-based military presence.65 An occupation of longer duration may give 
control over a wider area, although this will depend upon the facts of the case. In a number of 
cases, the Court has recognised that control over a building will suffice the cross the threshold 
and establish that those inside the building are within the state’s jurisdiction, by virtue of the 
state’s ‘total, exclusive de facto’ control of the premises.66  
2.3. Confusion and Clarification 
For many years the personal and spatial models of control co-existed in relative harmony, in 
spite of some degree of uncertainty over which might be applied where. Typically the personal 
model was employed in cases like Freda, Vearncombe and Sánchez Ramirez,67 where the 
spatial model could not apply but it would be inconsistent with the object and purpose of the 
ECHR to deny the applicants any rights against the respondent states. The European Court then 
gave its decision as to the admissibility of Banković, which confused the matter. The decision 
was solely based on the spatial model of jurisdiction, with the Court’s Grand Chamber omitting 
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to mention the personal model.68 Yet the personal model continued to be applied in other later 
cases (Öcalan, Issa and Medvedyev69 being noted examples). A decade of confusion was 
cleared up (at least in part) when the Grand Chamber gave its judgment in Al-Skeini. 
2.3.1. Banković v Belgium 
In a NATO bombing raid on Belgrade, 16 civilians were killed when a missile hit a television 
station.70 Those injured and the deceased’s next of kin began proceedings before the European 
Court against those states that participated in the raid. In its admissibility decision, the Court 
stated that the jurisdictional competence of states is ‘primarily territorial’.71 Any other bases of 
jurisdiction, beyond those recognised in customary international law and treaty provisions (such 
as the acts of consular and diplomatic officials) would be ‘exceptional and [require] special 
justification’.72 The Court agreed with the respondent governments that the facts of this case 
did not fall within any of those special justifications and to rule otherwise would be 
[T]antamount to arguing that anyone adversely affected by an act imputable to a Contracting 
State, wherever in the world that act may have been committed or its consequences felt, is 
thereby brought within the jurisdiction of that State.73 
The Court noted the principles in the case law that extraterritorial jurisdiction would be 
recognised 
[W]hen the respondent State, through the effective control of the relevant territory and its 
inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the consent, invitation 
or acquiescence of the Government of that territory, exercises all or some of the public powers 
normally to be exercised by that Government.74 
 
The need for the exercise of executive authority was required because of the Court’s judgment 
that the Convention rights cannot be ‘divided and tailored’ and that the positive obligation to 
secure them is only engaged when the state is in a position to secure them en bloc.75 
Although the principle that the state’s Convention obligations are not limited to its own 
territory had been repeated in case law, the Banković Court also noted that the Convention is a 
‘multi-lateral treaty operating … in an essentially regional context’ and that it would not apply 
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outside the legal space of the Council of Europe territories.76 Turkey’s jurisdiction in Loizidou 
and the other Northern Cyprus cases was rationalised on the basis that the occupied territories 
remained part of Cypriot sovereign territory. They form part of the espace juridique of the 
Council of Europe, territories which would ordinarily be covered by the Convention.77 The 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was not a member of the Council of Europe and therefore its 
citizens were not entitled to ECHR protections.  
Academics have strongly criticised the Banković judgment for its dubious PIL 
references to the detriment of the object and purpose of the ECHR and for unnaturally limiting 
the ECHR’s application to the territories of states parties.78 The Banković Court adopted a 
restrictive interpretation of jurisdiction resembling some of the doctrinal elements of 
jurisdiction in PIL, including the strong relationship to territory that limits a state’s legal right 
to ‘impose its will’.79 Although not free from criticism, some of the Court’s reasoning is sound. 
Many of the rights in the ECHR impose negative and positive obligations on states. The Court 
is correct that a state must exercise some governmental functions in a territory to be able to put 
in place the mechanisms and systems to fulfil the positive obligation to individuals within that 
territory. For instance, in relation to the right to life,80 the European Court has judged that states 
are under the positive obligation to enact a domestic legal framework to criminalise the 
intentional deprivation of life.81 Where a state is acting in another territory but does not exercise 
any governmental functions in respect of that territory, it cannot be expected to put such a 
framework in place in pursuit of its positive ECHR obligations. But it would be quite wrong to 
apply that reasoning to the negative obligation. The negative obligation imparted under Article 
2 requires state agents to refrain from killing intentionally. States do not need to exercise any 
control over territory to prevent their agents from pulling the trigger, as they exercise control 
over those agents wherever they are in the world and are therefore in a position to affect 
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individuals’ rights, since it is through the actions and omissions of its agents that states exercise 
control over those individuals. The judgment in Banković was arguably misguided.   
The Banković judgment was ‘inevitably politically charged’.82 Eight weeks before the 
Court handed down its judgment, a United States-led coalition invaded Afghanistan. The 
Court’s interpretation of jurisdiction in Banković might prevent the application of the ECHR to 
the Afghanistan conflict, since at the time of the judgment the invading coalition did not have 
effective control of the country. Whilst such control might have solidified later, and the 
invading forces might have come to exercise some governmental functions, in making its 
judgment the Court was arguably conscious of limiting potential cases to come out of the 
conflict. In spite of this, a state’s international obligations under the ECHR should not be 
restricted by reference to the legal limits of the state’s domestic law.83 Jurisdiction in PIL is a 
formalistic concept determining where and in what circumstances a state can impose its will, 
whether that be its civil, criminal, constitutional, or any other body of law. Jurisdiction in IHRL, 
however, is ‘discerned from a factual scenario which arises by virtue of circumstance’.84 
Whether an individual’s human rights under the ECHR, or any other international human rights 
instrument, have been violated does not depend upon the legal limits of a state’s domestic 
authority. It is a question of fact. The Banković Court strayed from this line of reasoning. 
One of the problems with the ruling in Banković is that the Court does not seek to define 
‘territory’. The Court had in previous cases accepted control of a building as effective control 
of territory such as to bring the individuals therein detained within the controlling state’s 
jurisdiction. The question then becomes whether there is a minimum area over which control 
must be exercised. Would control of a single room in the building count? Or the area of ground 
in which the state agent stands? At this point, the spatial model seems to collapse into the 
personal model. It is far easier to accept that an individual is within a state’s jurisdiction because 
he is personally within the control of that state’s agents than it is to accept that state’s 
jurisdiction applied because of control of a particular square-footage. The Court offered some 
remedy to this problem by introducing the requirement that the state exercise governmental 
functions over the territory. But this is also poorly defined, and the ability of state agents to 
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violate individual rights is not parasitic on the exercise of governmental functions over a 
territory.  
2.3.2. Al-Skeini v United Kingdom  
Ten years after Banković, the Grand Chamber handed down its judgment in Al-Skeini v United 
Kingdom. During the US–UK military operations in Iraq, British troops had killed five Iraqi 
nationals whilst on patrol in Basra City. A sixth individual, Baha Mousa, died in security 
detention in a British military prison. The British Government conceded that Baha Mousa was 
within British jurisdiction by virtue of exclusive British control of the detention premises. The 
British House of Lords, following Banković, ruled that the first five individuals were not within 
British jurisdiction at the time of their deaths for two reasons. First, because as a regional treaty 
the ECHR could not apply outside the territories of the Council of Europe, and second because 
the UK did not have effective control of Basra.85 
In its judgment, the European Court’s Grand Chamber repeated the principle that states’ 
jurisdiction is primarily territorial and that jurisdiction is normally exercised throughout a 
state’s national territory.86 But the Grand Chamber detailed the ‘exceptional circumstances 
capable of giving rise to the exercise of jurisdiction by a contracting state outside its own 
boundaries’.87 The first is the ‘very broad principle’ that 
[A] Contracting State’s jurisdiction under Article 1 may extend to acts of its authorities which 
produce effects outside its own territory.88 
 
The Court affirmed that ‘the use of force by a State’s agents operating outside its territory may 
bring the individual thereby brought under the control of the State’s authorities into the State’s 
Article 1 jurisdiction’.89 The Court expressed the opinion that in cases where state agents, acting 
outside the state’s territory, held an individual in custody, jurisdiction did not arise because of 
the state’s control of the detention premises or vessel; ‘What is decisive in such cases in the 
exercise of physical power and control over the person in question’.90 In a situation where a 
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state exercises physical power and control over an individual, the Article 1 obligation to extends 
to ‘the rights and freedoms under Section I of the Convention that are relevant to the situation 
of that individual’,91 but not necessarily all of the ECHR rights.  
In its judgment, the Court said that individuals may be within the state’s jurisdiction 
abroad when, with the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the territorial government, it 
exercises some of the public powers normally be exercised by that government.92 The Court 
referred to its earlier decision in Banković, and although the Banković Court rejected the ‘cause-
and-effect’ notion of jurisdiction for single instantaneous acts – such as dropping a missile or 
firing a gun – the Court clarified in Al-Skeini that the individuals affected by such acts would 
be within the state’s jurisdiction where the state is also exercising public powers.93 This is a 
somewhat disappointing turn by the Court. Although it goes on to say that those under the direct 
physical control of state agents are within the jurisdiction of that state,94 this creates a lacuna in 
the law according to which it would be permissible for a soldier acting outside the territory of 
his own state to attack an individual with a long-range weapon, and the victim would have no 
enforceable right against the soldier’s state.  
Several scholars have remarked that the Court’s judgment is an odd fusion of the 
personal and spatial models, with individuals being within the state’s jurisdiction when, through 
the exercise of public powers, it has control and authority over them.95 But that is a misreading 
of the Court’s general principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The reference to public powers 
arguably pays lip-service to Banković, but jurisdiction does not arise solely from the exercise 
of public powers. The exercise of the public powers model, detailed in paragraph 135 of the 
Court’s judgment, is one discrete form of personal control, as evidenced by the Court 
numbering this separately from other options of authority and control. The Court also confirmed 
that the Article 1 obligation will be engaged when, as a consequence of military action (whether 
or not that action is lawful), a state exercises effective control of a territory, either directly, 
through its armed forces, or through a subordinate local administration.96 Unlike the personal 
model, the obligation under the effective control of territory doctrine requires the state to secure 
all the Convention rights.97 The fact that a subordinate local administration survives by virtue 
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of a state’s support will engage the Article 1 obligation in respect of that territory, whether or 
not the state is actively involved in policy-making.98  
Effective control of territory is a question of fact.99 The Court may have regard of the 
strength of the state’s military presence in the area,100 as well as other indicators such as the 
extent to which the military, political and economic support bolsters the local administration.101 
Territories under a state’s effective control are not analogous to ‘territories for whose 
international relations it is responsible’,102 and Article 56 of the Convention cannot be used to 
exclude the state’s Convention responsibilities in occupied territories (which have a different 
status in international law than colonies and dependencies).103 The Court made reference to the 
espace juridique principle, repeating that the Convention cannot bind states not parties to it,104 
and that it is a constitutional instrument of European public order.105 It affirmed that where the 
armed forces of a Convention state occupy the territory of another Convention state, the 
occupying state is bound by the Convention so as to prevent a ‘regrettable vacuum’ within the 
Convention legal space.106 It clarified, though, that this rule does not prevent application of the 
Convention beyond Council of Europe Member States’ territories, and that it had never applied 
such a restriction in its case law.107 Though the Convention is of ‘essentially regional 
vocation’,108 that should not be understood as ‘exclusively regional vocation’.109  
It has been argued that Banković was wrongly interpreted by the British judiciary, and 
that that judgment did nothing more than exclude aerial bombardment from the list of actions 
giving rise to effective control.110 Whether or not this is correct, the espace juridique principle 
can no longer be a realistic argument that states are not bound by the Convention beyond the 
Council of Europe’s borders, or that jurisdiction in IHRL is the same as jurisdiction in PIL. The 
judgment in Al-Skeini seems to lack any principled reasoning or attempt to rationalise the 
diverse list of discrete conditions for jurisdiction. Instead, it is a mere restatement (with some 
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modifications or clarifications) of what the Court had said in previous cases. The Grand 
Chamber had the opportunity to thoroughly reject Banković and ensure that where states 
exercise physical control over an individual that individual is within its jurisdiction. Al-Skeini 
represented a chance for the Grand Chamber to properly consider the decades of Article 1 
jurisprudence and think out a principled approach to what jurisdiction actually means, but the 
opportunity was missed.  
Ultimately, the Al-Skeini Court ruled that there is nothing in its case law or the 
Convention itself that restricts the scope of states’ obligations to their own territories, or even 
to territories within the espace juridique of the Council of Europe. Those obligations bind states 
in their actions overseas as well. Both the personal and spatial models of jurisdiction are 
applicable and relevant to determining to whom states owe ECHR obligations. In Al-Skeini, the 
United Kingdom,  
[T]hrough its troops engaged in security operations in Basra during the period in question, 
exercised authority and control over individuals killed in the course of such security 
operations, such as to establish a jurisdictional link between the United Kingdom and the 
deceased for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention.111 
 
The Court did not examine whether the UK had effective control of the territory, and resolved 
the issue resorting exclusively to the personal model. 
The judgment in Al-Skeini is not a panacea for the confusion caused by different 
interpretations of jurisdiction adopted in the Court’s earlier case law. But in some measure it 
has undone some of the ‘residual confusion’ of the personal model being applied after the 
Banković judgment.112 The tenor of the Al-Skeini judgment is that ‘control entails 
responsibility’,113 although some have suggested Banković would not be decided any differently 
today.114 The judgment in Al-Skeini has come on a ‘need-to-decide basis’,115 but it confirmed 
that state agent authority and control is a viable and legitimate model for determining if states 
owe given individual obligations under the ECHR. It is not, as some have suggested, merely 
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‘territorial-lite’.116 It is clear, however, from the Court’s ruling in Al-Skeini, that a narrow 
interpretation of Article 1 is untenable given states’ ability to project their power globally and 
to impact individuals’ rights in territories that they do not control.117 The Al-Skeini judgment is 
not really a change of tack, since the Court had adopted the personal model of jurisdiction even 
after the Grand Chamber’s Banković judgment. Rather it is a response to misinterpretations of 
the Court’s jurisprudence by national courts and academics. Though the Banković judgment 
appeared authoritative on the meaning of jurisdiction because it was a Grand Chamber 
judgment, it only set out the meaning of jurisdiction as it related to the facts of that case, rather 
than an exhaustive and definitive list of when individuals are within a state’s jurisdiction for 
the purposes of Article 1.   
 
3. Soldiers before the Supreme Court 
The principles and rules established in the European Court’s case law have been developed in 
cases where individuals have been affected by the extraterritorial acts of state agents. The 
Commission in Cyprus said that authorised agents of the state remain within the state’s 
jurisdiction when abroad, but it has never affirmed that this is the case when the agents are the 
victims of alleged violations – only when they are the alleged perpetrators. The European Court 
was recently seized of a case of a British soldier killed on active service in Iraq, but a friendly 
settlement was reached between the applicant and the British Government before the European 
Court came to consider the case.118 As such, the European Court has never examined whether 
soldiers, who by virtue of being authorised by their state bring individuals over whom they have 
authority and control into their state’s jurisdiction, are also within the state’s jurisdiction for the 
purposes of human rights violations they suffer.   
The UKSC has grappled with this issue twice, relating to the Convention rights of 
British soldiers serving abroad. In applying the Court’s jurisprudence, the UKSC has been 
mindful that the Convention bodies have never been faced with similar facts, and that its 
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judgments must be based on the general principles established by the Court.119 The UKSC came 
to different conclusions regarding jurisdiction in the two cases, but the European Court’s 
judgment in Al-Skeini was handed down in the period between them. 
 
3.1. R (on the application of Smith) v Secretary of State for Defence 
3.1.1. Facts and Appellate History 
In March 2003, US forces in coalition with contingents from the UK, Poland, Australia and 
other nations launched an invasion of Iraq. Following the ouster of Saddam Hussein and his 
Ba’ath party the victorious allies established the Coalition Provisional Authority (‘the CPA’), 
which was later recognised as the sovereign government of Iraq.120 Coalition forces remained 
in Iraq as occupying powers until the CPA handed power to the Iraqi Interim Government in 
June 2004. From then, those forces remained in Iraq at the request of the new government, to 
assist with peace-keeping and reconstruction. The last British forces withdrew in 2011.  
Private Smith was a British soldier deployed to Iraq and stationed in Basra. He was 
found collapsed in a doorway and rushed to the military hospital on the British base. He later 
died of heatstroke. His mother claimed that procedural irregularities in the coroner’s inquest 
into Smith’s death constituted a violation of his right to life under Article 2 of the ECHR. The 
primary question for this appeal was whether the ECHR applied to Smith at all at the time of 
his death, since he was on active service outside the UK and outside the espace juridique of the 
Council of Europe. The British Government conceded that its jurisdiction extended to the 
military base abroad on the basis of the spatial model of jurisdiction, but contended that its 
obligation to protect ECHR rights ended as soon as soldiers stepped off-base.  
In the High Court, Collins J ruled that Smith was within the UK’s jurisdiction and 
enjoyed his ECHR rights at the time of his death.121 In the Court of Appeal, Sir Anthony Clarke 
MR, Keene and Dyson LJJ affirmed the judge’s ruling.122 The judges held that soldiers are 
always within the state’s jurisdiction, even when on active service abroad and outside the 
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military base. The Government lodged a final appeal to the UKSC. Nine justices sat in 
judgment, delivering a 6-3 majority verdict in the Government’s favour. The state’s jurisdiction, 
they said, is territorial and ends at the walls of the base. 
3.1.2. Lord Collins SCJ 
Lord Collins SCJ gave the leading judgment. He decided the case on the basis of the territorial 
model of jurisdiction, citing Banković. At the time of Smith’s death, the UK had been 
responsible for the four south-easternmost of Iraq’s eighteen governorates, where 8,000 troops 
were responsible for a population of almost three million, spread over roughly 40,000 square 
miles. Remembering that effective control of an area is a question of fact, established inter alia 
by the number of troops in the territory and the duration of the control, Lord Collins was not 
satisfied that the UK could have had effective control of the area under its responsibility at the 
time of Smith’s death.123 The European Court has never come up with a golden ratio of troops 
required to establish control, but to put the numbers in perspective, in Loizidou 40,000 Turkish 
troops were stationed in Northern Cyprus, an area of around 1,250 square miles and a 
population of almost 300,000. This suggests that there is a minimum ratio of troops to territory 
and population to establish effective control. Lord Collins did not elaborate on whether he had 
considered other factors in his estimation, such as the degree of hostility towards the occupying 
troops.  
Lord Collins mentioned the references to PIL in Banković, which affirmed that states 
may exercise jurisdiction extraterritorially at the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the 
territorial state.124 Lord Collins considered that British forces could not have been exercising 
jurisdiction on these grounds at the relevant time, since the UK was a belligerent occupant at 
the relevant time.125 Furthermore, since all legislative and executive power was vested in the 
CPA (in whose decision-making processes the UK had no substantive role) the UK could not 
be said to be exercising governmental functions in respect of the territory as required by 
Banković.126 
Lord Collins went on to observe that the Commission’s ruling in Cyprus (No 1) that 
extraterritorial acts or omissions could bring individuals within the state’s jurisdiction is 
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inconsistent with the text of Article 1, which refers to individuals being within the state’s 
jurisdiction, rather than acts.127 The personal model, Lord Collins said, is without foundation in 
the Court’s case law and inconsistent with the Banković rule that jurisdiction is primarily 
territorial. Furthermore, it is dissonant with the concept of the ECHR as an instrument of 
European public order operating in a regional context.128 His Lordship made reference129 to the 
European Court’s Marković judgment that an individual need not be in the territory of a state 
for the existence of a ‘jurisdictional link’,130 but rejected the argument that this created a basis 
of jurisdiction separate to those confirmed in Banković.131  
Lord Collins rationalised the European Court’s use of the personal model on the basis 
that many of the cases in which it was applied involved individuals detained by state agents 
acting abroad in anticipation of rendition to and trial within that state’s territory. In Öcalan, for 
instance, the applicant was being transported back to Turkey to stand trial, as were the claimants 
in Medvedyev. It is common sense, Lord Collins said, that the ECHR should apply to these 
individuals, but that does nothing more than create another exception to the prevailing Banković 
rule that jurisdiction is primarily territorial.132 
The facts of this case, Lord Collins concluded, came nowhere close to being within the 
exceptions to territorial jurisdiction clarified by the Grand Chamber in Banković. The cases 
employing the personal model were inconsistent with that precedent and should not be 
considered authoritative. Soldiers who are off-base in conflict zones would not be within the 
state’s jurisdiction without fulfilling the Banković conditions for effective control or consent, 
invitation or acquiescence of the local government along with an exercise of governmental 
functions. 
The majority of the Supreme Court agreed with Lord Collins, although Lord Hope DP 
expressed his opinion that the Supreme Court must go no further than the European Court in 
determining the proper scope of Article 1, and that Strasbourg is the appropriate forum to clarify 
the issue.133 Lord Mance wrote a powerful dissenting judgment. The Court’s Al-Skeini 
judgment was handed down soon after this appeal, and confirmed that state agent authority and 
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control is indeed a basis of jurisdiction under the Convention. Subsequently, the UKSC was 
asked again to consider whether British soldiers were within the UK’s jurisdiction when on 
overseas deployments. 
3.2. Smith and Others v Ministry of Defence 
 3.2.1. Facts and Appellate History 
The claims in Smith and others v Ministry of Defence were based on three sets of facts, all 
taking place during the invasion and occupation of Iraq. The facts can be divided into what 
Lord Hope DP called the ‘Challenger’ claims and the ‘Snatch’ claims.134 The ‘Snatch’ claims 
arose out of two separate incidents, in which Pte E and Pte H were travelling in lightly-armoured 
Snatch Land Rovers. Both were killed when improvised explosive devices (‘IEDs’) were 
detonated level with their vehicles. Neither vehicle had been fitted with functioning electronic 
counter-measures (‘ECMs’), which might have prevented their deaths. The ‘Challenger’ claims 
were brought in negligence only.   
In the High Court, Owen J handed down judgment for the Government, striking out the 
‘Snatch’ claims.135 Quoting extensively from Smith No 1, the judge was clear that the soldiers 
had not been within the UK’s jurisdiction at the time of their deaths for the reasons given in the 
first case. In the Court of Appeal, Moses LJ dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judge’s 
ruling.136 Rimer LJ and Lord Neuberger P agreed137 that the Court in Al-Skeini had revived the 
personal model but that the facts did not disclose sufficient authority and control in this case. 
Jurisdiction is not conferred, they agreed, 
By the status of armed forces owing allegiance to one of the high contracting parties, but by 
virtue of the exercise of physical power and control through the agency of its armed forces in 
an area over which it exercised effective control.138 
 
The families lodged an appeal to the UKSC. Seven justices judged the appeal, of whom five 
(Lord Walker, Lady Hale, Lord Kerr, Lord Mance SCJJ and Lord Hope DP) had sat in Smith 
(No 1). On the question of H and E being within UK jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1, 
the UKSC was unanimous. Lord Hope DP gave the leading judgment. 
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 3.2.2. Lord Hope DP 
At the time H and E were killed, power had passed to the Iraqi Interim Government, at whose 
request British forces remained in Iraq aiding in security and reconstruction efforts. The 
‘Snatch’ claims were not concerned with effective control of territory, or a vacuum in the 
Convention legal space, but with state agent authority and control.139 In its judgment, the Al-
Skeini Court had revived the state agent authority and control model of jurisdiction and 
determined that Convention rights can be ‘divided and tailored’.140 As Lord Hope understood 
it, 
The extra-territorial obligation of the contracting state is to ensure the observance of the rights 
and freedoms that are relevant to the individual who is under its agents’ authority and control, 
and it does not need to be more than that.141 
 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 will depend upon the particular facts 
of a case.142 The fact that the European Court had never dealt with a case with analogous facts 
to the present one was no cause for concern, since ‘[t]he whole structure of the judgment [in 
Al-Skeini] is designed to identify general principles with reference to which national courts may 
exercise their own judgment’.143 His Lordship went on to identify three principles in the Court’s 
Al-Skeini judgment that demonstrate that the majority ruling in Smith (No 1) can no longer be 
considered good law. 
First, 
[T]he principle relating to state agent authority and control is to be regarded as one of general 
application. The words ‘whenever the state through its agents exercises authority and control 
over an individual, and thus jurisdiction’, can be taken to be a summary of the exceptional 
circumstances in which, under this category, the state can be held to be exercising its 
jurisdiction extra-territorially.144 
 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction is an exception, requiring special justification, to the general 
territorial principle, but this should not be understood to create an especially high factual 
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threshold to establishing that individuals abroad are within the state’s jurisdiction. 
‘Exceptional’ merely denotes the frequency of the occurrence.145 
Second, the judgment in Al-Skeini reconciled the inconsistency of the European Court’s 
preceding jurisprudence. State agent authority and control is not linked to territory, but relates 
to the control of an individual, as the Court described that test in Issa.   
The fact that Issa is included in para 136 as one of the examples of cases that fall within the 
general principle of state agent authority and control is particularly noteworthy. It anchors that 
case firmly in the mainstream of the Strasbourg court’s jurisprudence on this topic.146 
 
Whereas the UKSC in Smith (No 1) had dismissed Issa and its like as aberrations for being 
inconsistent with Banković,147 the Court’s judgment in Al-Skeini means that ‘[i]t is Banković 
which can no longer be considered authoritative’ on the question of the personal model of 
jurisdiction.148 
Finally, the Court laid to rest the notion that ECHR rights are indivisible. In Banković 
the Court said that if states are to ensure any ECHR rights, they must ensure all ECHR rights, 
which justified the high threshold of extraterritorial jurisdiction. But in relation to this ruling, 
His Lordship observed that 
It was always going to be difficult to see how, if that was to be the guiding principle, it could 
be possible to accept that a state’s armed forces abroad in whatever circumstances were within 
their jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 as its ability to guarantee the entire range of 
Convention rights would in many cases be severely limited.149 
 
An ‘all-or-nothing’ approach to securing ECHR rights is inconsistent with the Court’s ruling, 
like that of the Human Rights Committee, that the ECHR cannot be interpreted in such a way 
as to allow state agents to behave like ‘gentlemen at home, hoodlums elsewhere’.150 It is now 
clear that states are only expected to secure the rights relevant to the nature and extent of the 
control exercised over an individual.151 When soldiers are deployed abroad, states’ ability to 
fulfil their positive obligations to them arising out of the ECHR will be limited for a number of 
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reasons. But the state is still in a position of control over individual soldiers and through the 
exercise of its significant coercive powers is still capable of violating its negative obligations. 
If states were not bound by their negative obligations because it would be impracticable to 
expect them to fulfil their positive obligations, states could violate individual rights with 
impunity.   
When it comes to the state’s responsibility for the acts of its armed forces abroad, it 
seems to be ‘the premise from which extra-territorial jurisdiction based on state agent authority 
and control has been developed’ that soldiers are within the state’s jurisdiction, though the 
Court has never directly answered this question.152 In Cyprus (No 1), the Commission decided 
that armed forces remain within the jurisdiction of the state.153 Lord Hope concluded 
It is plain, especially when one thinks of the way the armed forces operate, that authority and 
control is exercised by the state throughout the chain of command from the very top all the 
way down to men and women operating in the front line. Servicemen and women relinquish 
almost total control over their lives to the state. It does not seem possible to separate them, in 
their capacity as state agents, from those whom they affect when they are exercising authority 
on the state’s behalf. They are all brought within the state’s article 1 jurisdiction by the 
application of the same general principle.154 
 
Lord Hope also referred to the provision enacted by Parliament that soldiers are always subject 
to military law, wherever they are in the world, in or out of uniform.155  
It is further evidence of the level of control exercised over soldiers by the state that they 
are generally beholden to military law without territorial limit and may, in serious cases, be 
court-martialled anywhere in the world.156 Lord Hope alludes to the fact that, as agents of the 
state, soldiers may by their actions bring individuals within the state’s jurisdiction. But the fact 
that soldiers are the conduit through which the state’s jurisdiction over individuals is exercised 
does not determine that soldiers themselves are within the state’s jurisdiction. Simply by virtue 
of being state agents, soldiers are themselves under the authority and control of the state, 
irrespective of whether they are capable of bringing others within the state’s jurisdiction by 
their actions or controlling a territory outside the state’s own borders. This is quite a change 
from Moses LJ’s dictum that soldiers are only within the state’s jurisdiction to the extent that 
they are the conduit through which the state controls a territory.   
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Finally, Lord Hope referred to the Court’s practice, approved of by the Grand 
Chamber,157 of using intrinsically non-binding instruments to aid in the interpretation of the 
Convention. Recommendation 1742 (2006)158 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe provides that 
[M]embers of the armed forces are citizens in uniform who must enjoy the same fundamental 
freedoms and the same protection of their rights and dignity as any other citizen, within the 
limits imposed by the specific exigencies of military duties. In para 3 it was emphasised that 
members of the armed forces cannot be expected to respect humanitarian law and human rights 
in their operations unless respect for human rights is guaranteed within the army ranks.159 
 
Lord Mance’s judgment in Smith (No 1) touched upon this recommendation, inasmuch as an 
armed conflict situation may mitigate the extent of the state’s protective duty to its soldiers, but 
does not affect the existence of that duty.160 
The Smith (No 1) judgment, Lord Hope concluded, should be departed from, since it is 
inconsistent with the Grand Chamber’s guidance in Al-Skeini. The jurisdiction of the UK must, 
in line with this guidance, extend to securing the Convention rights of British soldiers on 
overseas deployments and, at the time of their deaths, H and E were within the jurisdiction of 
the UK for the purposes of Article 1. This ruling 
[W]ould not be inconsistent with the general principles of international law, as no other state is 
claiming jurisdiction over them. The extent of that protection, and in particular whether the 
MOD was under a substantive duty of the kind for which the Snatch Land Rover claimants 
contend, is the question which must now be considered.161 
 
The other Supreme Court justices sitting in judgment on this case all agreed with Lord Hope’s 
opinion.   
In a complete reversal of its earlier position, the UKSC laid down a new bottom line: 
British soldiers are within the jurisdiction of the UK, no matter where they are. Without the 
European Court’s explicit clarification in Al-Skeini, Smith (No 2) would not have come before 
the higher courts at all, as the first Smith judgment would have prevented such claims on the 
basis that the soldiers were not within the UK’s jurisdiction at the relevant times. Similarly, the 
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Supreme Court’s renewed investigation of the jurisdiction question would not have been 
necessary had the House of Lords’ interpretation of Banković been correct. The European 
Court’s judgment in Al-Skeini both enabled and necessitated that the UKSC change tack. 
It is not clear whether the European Court would agree with the UKSC judgment that 
soldiers are within the jurisdiction of the state by virtue of the control and discipline that is 
characteristic of service in a modern military. It has been observed that the European Court has 
relied upon the personal model where jurisdiction under the spatial test cannot be satisfied but 
it would be unjust or arbitrary to deny that the state owed the applicant any responsibility under 
the Convention.162 The UKSC relied upon the personal model in Smith (No 2) to ensure that 
British soldiers will always enjoy their Convention rights when on deployment abroad, even 
though the UK will not, in most cases, have effective control of the foreign territories to which 
it deploys its armed forces. 
The UKSC judgment, and that of the European Court in Al-Skeini, both reflect the fact 
that the international human rights instruments do not purport to regulate inter-state 
relationships. Although those instruments are treaties that form part of the larger corpus of PIL, 
which governs states’ rights and duties in respect of each other, the human rights instruments 
regulate a different kind of state conduct, and the doctrinal tenets of jurisdiction in regulating 
inter-state relationships are inapt to define the limits of states’ responsibilities to individuals. A 
state’s ability to violate an individual’s rights are not dependent upon that state’s control of the 
territory, or of the exercise of governmental functions over it, as was demonstrated in Öcalan, 
Issa, Freda and so many other cases. By becoming a party to an international human rights 
instrument, a state undertakes to behave in certain accepted ways in relation to individuals. 
Whilst the treaties provide for mutual and collective enforcement of accepted standards, the 
primary obligation is to individuals. The concept of jurisdiction in PIL seeks to preserve states’ 
sovereignty and the sovereign equality of states. But it would be wrong to use those 
foundational principles of international law to undermine state liability for violating obligations 
freely undertaken.  
4. Implications 
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The international and regional human rights are reciprocal agreements between states and 
therefore have a public law character. The doctrine of jurisdiction in PIL, although some parts 
of it are contested, has an accepted core meaning according to which the exercise of state power 
and authority is limited to the state’s own territory. The European Court, and the other 
international human rights tribunals that have followed its lead, have interpreted jurisdiction in 
a wholly different way. Yet this should not be considered to have altered the nature and limits 
of states’ powers vis-à-vis each other. The traditional concept of jurisdiction as limiting states’ 
powers to their own territories except in certain circumstances continues to play a fundamental 
role in international law. If a state wishes to impose and enforce its law beyond its own borders, 
it may do so only in line with the concept of jurisdiction in PIL. The broad mantra that states’ 
powers are limited to their territories is still good law.  
IHRL creates a different kind of obligation. As previously mentioned, the international 
and regional human rights treaties create mutual collective enforcement mechanisms through 
bodies such as the Human Rights Committee, the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. These supranational bodies may issue judgments or 
decisions requiring states to make reparations for violating individual rights or 
recommendations for future practice. But the principal obligation enshrined in the treaties is to 
individuals. That obligation is not delimited according to territory. One of the main factors 
motivating the restriction of states’ jurisdiction to their national territories in PIL is the need to 
respect states’ sovereignty and equality. If a state’s agents exercise their own state’s jurisdiction 
in the territory of another state, it may constitute a violation of those principles (where certain 
conditions are not met) and the territorial state may be able to seek redress.  
But I would suggest that it is not a violation of state sovereignty to make states liable 
for their human rights violations anywhere in the world. In Öcalan, Turkey was liable for IHRL 
violations perpetrated against the applicant when he was arrested and detained in Kenya. Kenya 
could not be held liable for those violations under the ECHR, since it is not a party to that 
Convention and therefore not bound by its provisions. Imposing liability on Turkey ensured it 
upheld its Convention obligations but did not result in any damage to Kenya. In addition, whilst 
any Turkish reparations to Kenya for violating its sovereignty by enforcing its law in Kenyan 
territory would redress the violation of PIL, such reparations would be made to Kenya rather 
than to the individual whose rights were violated by the action itself. There is fragmentation in 
the two concepts of jurisdiction, but only where the nature of the obligations themselves 
requires it. Adoption of a PIL-inspired concept of jurisdiction linked to territory would 
 40 
undermine the nature and purpose of IHRL as a body of law creating or recognising obligations 
on states to behave in a certain way in respect of individuals. Rejecting that link, where the 
nature of obligations requires it, demonstrates the flexibility of PIL in adapting to new 
challenges and creating meaningful and practicable obligations on states. This should be 
celebrated as one of the strengths of PIL.  
The most immediate implication of the European Court’s Al-Skeini judgment and the 
UKSC’s judgment in Smith (No 2) is that British soldiers are always within the UK’s 
jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 of the ECHR. In Their Lordships’ estimation, the 
military command structure and the culture of discipline and obedience and respect for superior 
orders and civilian control that characterise modern military service163 equate to ‘authority and 
control’. States exercising effective control of territory are required to secure the whole 
pantheon of ECHR rights. When jurisdiction is exercised through state agent authority and 
control, states are only required to ensure those rights relevant to the nature and extent of the 
control. It has not yet been judicially established which rights are relevant to the nature and 
extent of the military command structure. I would be inclined to suggest that, on deployment 
abroad, states must be required to abide by their negative obligations arising out of the ECHR 
and must do nothing that would infringe soldiers’ rights. In each individual case domestic courts 
and the European Court might determine that any particular infringement was justified as 
‘necessary in a democratic society’164 or within the prudentially-determined limitations to 
ECHR rights. But the state will be liable in principle for any actual violation suffered by an 
individual within their authority and control. The authority and control exerted over soldiers 
gives states the capability to violate individual rights, a capability that must be curtailed. 
Whether the state can be liable for not upholding its positive obligations to soldiers on 
deployment is less certain. The positive obligations arising from ECHR require states to take 
positive steps, not only to refrain from violating individual rights, but to secure the ECHR 
rights. This requires states to prevent individual rights from being violated. In many cases 
enacting and enforcing a legal regime that deters and punishes wrongdoing (in criminal 
prosecutions or civil actions for damages where appropriate) will satisfy this obligation. The 
state may make provisions in military law that impose civil or criminal liability on soldiers in 
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order to fulfil its positive obligations. But the greater problem is how to protect soldiers from 
human rights violations perpetrated by the enemy. IHRL continues to apply in times of armed 
conflict,165 and human rights are not a ‘fair-weather friend to humanity’.166 How those positive 
obligations might be implemented in times of armed conflict, and indeed whether those positive 
obligations exist at all in armed conflict, is the question posed after Smith (No 2). The UKSC’s 
judgment that British soldiers are within the UK’s jurisdiction for the purposes of IHRL requires 
that this question now be answered. This poses tremendous difficulties, in ensuring that rights 
are adequately protected whilst balancing those rights with military needs and subjecting states 
to obligations that are realistic and practicable. In this context, rigid rules are impractical and 
this kind of decision will always have to be taken on an ad hoc basis, taking into account all the 
circumstances of the case including the nature of the violation complained of.  
One question is whether the spatial model of jurisdiction is in any way relevant after the 
Al-Skeini judgment. Whilst the spatial model of jurisdiction is more restrictive than the 
personal, it is difficult to imagine any situation in which a state has effective control of a 
territory but not control of the individual. Indeed, in many cases in which the personal model 
of jurisdiction has been invoked, state agents had physical control over an individual in the form 
of detention. But the control and authority can be established by the exercise of a legal power 
over an individual as well. Do we really need the territorial model at all? 
It might well be argued that, since the European Court tends not to overrule its own 
previous judgments, the territorial model was included as a mode of exercising extraterritorial 
jurisdiction so as to perpetuate the illusion that Banković was decided correctly and was still 
‘good law’. However, it must be recognised that the nature and extent of control over an 
individual is very different when a state has control of territory than when it merely has someone 
in detention. Control of territory connotes a substantial physical presence and power to enact 
and enforce legal measures that affect the daily way of life of the whole local population. It is 
this control of the population, rather than control of the territory itself, that cements the ECHR 
obligations. 
Where a state has effective control of a territory, it has greater scope to enact laws that 
may violate the whole range of Convention rights, and a better opportunity to take measures 
that will guarantee all of the Convention rights. Where state agents have physical control over 
an individual, they enjoy a certain level of power over the most basic rights (such as the right 
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to life and freedom from torture), but are not in a position to put in place the legal measures to 
affect rights such as the right to marry. Effective control of territory is still relevant for 
jurisdiction, but only because it suggests a more complete level of control over individuals. 
In this article I have discussed ‘extraterritorial’ application of the Convention, but in 
truth this is a misnomer. Since the Convention is applicable wherever a state has control over 
an individual, and states, acting through their agents, may have control over individuals 
anywhere in the world (regardless of how we might justify that control under public 
international law), it is not just about states’ own territories. States are presumed to exercise 
jurisdiction throughout their territories, but that is a rebuttable presumption. The presumption 
stems not from the relationship between territory and statehood, but from the fact that control 
over territory entails a high level of control over individuals. Though states are expected to have 
control over territories to which they lay claim, the opposite can be true, as the Court has 
demonstrated in its Ilașcu and Cyprus judgments. Jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 is 
not concerned with whether state agents are acting abroad lawfully, only that someone is within 
their power as a matter of fact. 
5. Conclusion 
For as long as the Grand Chamber’s Banković judgment remained the leading case on the issue, 
the concept of jurisdiction in human rights law replicated the strong relationship between 
jurisdiction and territory as in public international law. This was an aberration, as PIL and IHRL 
regulate very different kinds of state behaviour. Whilst PIL jurisdiction determines the legality 
of states’ actions beyond their own borders (hence the important link to territory), that makes 
no impact on whether state agents are in a position to affect individuals’ enjoyment of their 
fundamental rights. In effect, the IHRL treaties, which are prefaced with references to the 
universality and inherence of human rights, create enforceable rights for all people in the world. 
Those treaties only bind the states that become parties to them, but those states are bound in 
respect of everyone within their authority and control.  
One might take a cultural relativist position and claim that the interpretation of the 
universal rights in the Convention reflects the values of Council of Europe Member States and 
should not be foisted upon other cultures.167 If one accepted this position and accordingly 
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adopted a narrow interpretation of Article 1, jurisdiction would maintain some link to territory, 
but on a basis other than arbitrary geographical limits. This position has, however, been 
rubbished as ‘crude chauvinism’.168 Ultimately, states parties to the Convention agree that their 
agents should treat individuals with a minimum standard of dignity and respect. They should 
not be allowed to abandon that standard because people with different cultural backgrounds 
have different conceptions of dignity and respect.   
 Borrowing the Human Rights Committee’s interpretation of the ICCPR, the European 
Court of Human Rights has judged that the Convention must not be interpreted in such a way 
that permits state agents to commit violations of the Convention abroad that they could not 
permissibly commit at home.169 Whether an individual’s human rights have been violated does 
not depend upon the state’s relationship to territory. As such, the traditional conception of 
jurisdiction in PIL as having a strong link to statehood and territory has no place in IHRL. But 
this should not be seen as undermining the traditional idea of jurisdiction. One word can have 
multiple meanings in different contexts. Perhaps, for the avoidance of doubt, the drafters of the 
IHRL treaties should have explicitly defined jurisdiction, or better still, avoided the word 
completely. It is of the utmost importance that we be sure to apply the right definition in the 
right place. 
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